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are far outweighed by the necessity for a reasonable regulation, particular-
ly in the First Amendment area." In the case of post-exhibition prosecu-
tion, the prior restraint operates only on unprotected material condemned
under the limited standard. The vast amount of material entitled to First
Amendment protection remains unrestrained. Since the legal machinery
attacks only material which has a clear causal connection to the evil that
the state is seeking to prevent, post-exhibition prosecution is a reasonable
means of regulation. Accused producers, distributors, or exhibitors have
the added assurance against subjective determinations in the presumption
of innocence and the trial by jury. While this form of regulation may not
be a panacea, it is the only type of legal machinery which can realistically be
squared with the constitutional guarantees.
Conclusion
Constitutional protection for motion picture content does not mean
there can be no control whatever. The inclusion of movies within the
protection of the First Amendment has forced governmental units to place
greater stress upon the interests in freedom of expression. The recent
decisions in this area call for expert legislative and judicial craftsmanship
and responsible determinations on the administrative levels when attempt
is made to prevent showing of movies deemed harmful to the public
morals. With the imposition of greater responsibility on governments
seeking to control movie content, the movie-goer will become more and
more the deciding factor of what is or is not to be viewed.
THE-UNSOLVED PROBLEMS IN PRIORITY FOR
FEDERAL TAX CLAIMS
As the Federal Government's tax program has increased in scope
the status of the Government's claim for taxes has taken on greater im-
portance. The right of the United States to priority does not arise from
the common law but depends entirely on three statutes:' The Bank-
69. See note 63 supra.
1. "The right of priority of payment of debts due to the government, is a preroga-
tive of the crown well known to the common law. . . . The claim of the United States,
however, does not stand upon any sovereign prerogative but is exclusively founded upon
the actual provisions of their own statutes." United States v. State Bank of North
Carolina, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 308, 310 (1832). See 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION § 54.20 (1943) questioning this view.
NOTES
ruptcy Act, Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes2 and Sections 3670-
3672 of the Internal Revenue Code.3
The Bankruptcy Act, in Section 67(b),' makes provision for the
priority of statutory liens over unsecured claims.5 If there is a tax claim
and a competing lien the question of priority is governed by the applic-
able lien law, that is, Section 3670.6 Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act' sets up its own system of priorities for unsecured creditors under
which federal, state, and local tax claims are fourth and the priority
created by Section 3466 is fifth. Under the Act federal tax claims are
thus subsequent to secured creditors and to three classes of unsecured
creditors.'
When the debtor is insolvent rather than bankrupt,9 there is a
marked difference in the treatment of creditors."0 Section 3466, the
2. "Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is
insufficient to pay all debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States
shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases in
which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary
assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or
absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to the cases in which an act of bank-
ruptcy is committed." REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952). Hereafter
referred to in this Note as Section 3466.
3. "If any person liable to pay any taxes neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all prop-
erty . . . belonging to such person." INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 3670, 53 STAT. 448
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321). This shall hereafter be referred to as Section
3670.
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien shall arise at the time
the assessment list was received by the collector. . . ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 3671,
53 STAT. 449 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6322).
"Such lien shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judge-
ment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collector. . . ." INT. REv. CODE
OF 1939, § 3672(a), 53 STAT. 882 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a)). This shall
be referred to as Section 3672.
Section 3670-72 of the Code of 1939 are §§ 6321-323 in the 1954 Code; the sections
are substantially the same.
4. 52 STAT. 876 (1938) as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1952).
5. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 67.20 (14th ed. 1942).
6. 4 id. ff 67.24.
7. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1952).
8. Section 3466 has been held inapplicable in bankruptcy proceedings. Adams v.
O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 (9th
Cir. 1946); In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1939); In re
Jacobson, 263 Fed. 883 (7th Cir. 1920). See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 64.502 (14th
ed. 1941).
9. For a discussion of what constitutes insolvency see 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 88 54.14-18.
10. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Per-
nicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954); Rogge, The
Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiver-
ships, 43 HARv. L. REv. 251 (1929); Notes, 30 N.C.L. REv. 442 (1952); 56 YALE L.J.
1258 (1947).
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basic provisions of which were enacted in 1797,11 provides that in this
event the debts owed the United States 2 take priority; the section does
not create a lien.' This act seems to give absolute priority to the United
States' claims since on its face it contains no exceptions. 4 Some writers
indicate that Congress did not intend federal priority over antecedent
liens,'5 but the courts have interpreted the statute in such manner so that
federal claims will defeat such liens if the latter are general and in-
choate; only creditors who have taken steps to "perfect" their lien before
the federal claim inheres are protected.' 6 The problem becomes one of
defining specificity and perfection, and this has been termed a federal
question.' By the device of finding that the lien lacked one or more of
the qualities of specificity, the Supreme Court has consistently denied
creditors priority over United States tax claims, and through the years
has avoided directly facing the question whether a specific and perfected
lien is superior to federal priority.' The result of all this is that al-
though equity receiverships and bankruptcy proceedings both deal with
the distribution of an insolvent's estate, the mere filing of a petition in
bankruptcy may, under the present system, radically change the creditor's
11. 1 STAT. 515 (1797).
12. Tax claims of the United States have been held to be debts within this provi-
sion. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
13. See cases cited in Annot., 77 L. Ed. 757, 772 (1932).
14. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 355 (1945).
15. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 907; Note, 29 N.C.L. REv. 293, 300 (1951) ; 68
HARv. L. REv. 722, 723 (1955).
16. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) ; Illinois ex rel.
Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946) ; United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn,
Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941); Spokane
County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929) ; Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 189 (1828); Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 271 (1817).
17. A state court's characterization, although entitled to weight, is always subject
to reexamination by the Supreme Court. If the state characterizes its lien as inchoate,
then this is practically conclusive. United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank,
340 U.S. 47, 49 (1950).
But see Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 94 (1929) ; United States
v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1942). One court stated: "In the interest of
orderly administration of justice in matters of concurrent jurisdiction, this court should
respect the state court's characterization ... " United States v. Acri, 109 F. Supp.
943, 945 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
18. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370 (1946); United States
v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, 323 U.S. 353, 355 (1945); Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska
Asiatic Lumber Mills, 84 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Alaska 1949).
Lower courts have given priority to liens which they have found specific and
perfected. See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.
1954), commented on in 68 HARV. L. REV. 722 (1955), 41 VA. L. Rv. 107 (1955);
Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic Lumber Mills, sapra; Evans v. Stewart, 66 N.W2d
442 (Iowa 1954).
For a further discussion of § 3466 see Blair, The Priority of the United States in
Equity Receivership, 38 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1925) ; Holman, The United States-Creditor,
9 FED. B.J. 261 (1948) ; Note, 20 U. CIN. L. Rrv. 274 (1951).
NOTES
rights.1" There is no adequate reason for this divergent treatment, and
it is argued that Section 3466 should be brought into conformity with
the policy of the Bankruptcy Act.20
Section 3670 creates a federal lien which attaches to all property2
belonging to a delinquent taxpayer. This statute,22 unlike Section 3466,
establishes a lien but does not create federal priority.23 Section 3672, in
order to protect certain prior interests against a secret lien, 4 was
amended to provide that the federal lien shall not be valid as against a
mortgagee, purchaser, judgment creditor, 25 or pledgee 6 until notice is
filed by the collector in the district in which the property subject to the
lien is situated.2 7 The standing of those liens which arose prior to the
tax lien and those which do not fall into the categories of Section 3672,
for example, attachments, garnishments, and mechanics and state tax
liens, are not dealt with in this statute, and the question is raised whether
the act should be read as if it contained a provision that federal tax liens
take precedence over creditors not mentioned, irrespective of whether
their rights came into existence prior to, or subsequent to, the time when
19. In nonbankruptcy proceedings a tax claim of the United States is entitled to
priority over state and municipal taxes which are not specific and perfected. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) ; United States v. Texas,
314 U.S. 480 (1941) ; Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
In bankruptcy proceedings under § 64 (a) the United States' tax claims have no
priority over a claim for taxes due to the state but both must share equally. 3 COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY 1111 64.02, 64.401; Rogge, supra note 10, at 252; Annot., 62 A.L.R. 146, 149
(1929) ; Annot., 97 L. Ed. 32, 47 (1952). For a comparison of treatment of wage
claims under § 3466 and the Bankruptcy Act see Note, 30 N.C.L. Rav. 442 (1952).
20. "[D]ifferences in priority have grown up around virtually independent statu-
tory provisions enacted with little or no thought to comparison. There is no sufficient
reason for such divergencies to continue to exist. . . ." Rogge, supra note 10, at 252.
See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 930-32; Note, 29 N.C.L. REv. 293, 301 (1951) ; 68 HARV.
L. REV. 722, 723 (1955).
21. State law has been applied to determine what constitutes property of the tax-
payer when the federal lien attaches. United States v. Cox, 119 F. Supp. 147, 150 (N.D.
Ga. 1953) ; United States v. Anders Contracting Co., 111 F. Supp. 700 (W.D.S.C. 1953).
For a general discussion as to what property the federal lien attaches see 9 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INcOiE TAXATION § 54.47-50; Anderson, Federal Taw Liens-Their Nature
and Priority, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 245-56 (1953) ; Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1373, 1378-386
(1948) ; Annot., 105 A.L.R. 1244, 1247-250 (1936).
22. The United States has had a statutory lien for unpaid taxes since 1866. 14
STAT. 107 (1866), Ray. STAT. § 3186 (1875).
23. United States v. The Pomare, 92 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D. Hawaii 1950).
24. Originally the federal tax lien was valid against subsequent purchasers or
creditors although they had no notice of the federal lien. United States v. Snyder, 149
U.S. 210 (1893).
25. 37 STAT. 1016 (1913).
26. 53 STAT. 882 (1939).
27. As to others § 3671 provided that the lien attach at the time the assessment list
was received by the collector. This has been changed so that under Section 6322 of the
1954 Code the lien arises from the making of the assessment.
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the tax lien attached under Section 3670.28 Cases have generally agreed
that if the federal lien is prior in time it will be prior in right.29 The real
problem of priority arises if the competing lien is prior in time and the
cases though in conflict applied the rule "first in time, first in right,"
and treated the federal lien as any other lien having no special priority."
The result reached in many of these cases, which gave priority to the
competing creditors of the Government, was that an inchoate lien prior
in time was superior in rank to a federal tax lien. The Supreme Court
in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank3 departed from
these cases and made the doctrine of the general and inchoate lien, which
was applied earlier to Section 3466, equally applicable to Section 3670.32
28. "No more here than in § 3466 is there any indication that Congress intended
the federal right to supercede an antecedent lien." Kennedy, supra note 10, at 922.
Note, 29 N.C.L. REv. 293, 300 (1951). But see Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950).
29. Macatee, Inc. v. United States, 214 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1954); Cobb v. United
States, 172 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d
963 (4th Cir. 1941) ; MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940) ; United
States v. Maddas, 109 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa. 1953) ; Samms v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 349 Ill. App. 413, 111 N.E.2d 172 (1953) ; United States v. Standard Brass & Mfg.
Co., 266 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). Contra, United States v. Woodside, 34 F.
Supp. 281 (W.D.S.C. 1940); Winston-Salem v. Powell Paving Co., 7 F. Supp. 424
(M.D. N.C. 1934); Berrymont Land Co. v. Davis Creek Land & Coal Co., 119 W. Va.
186, 192 S.E. 577 (1937).
30. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 924; Annot., 95 L. Ed. 59, 67 (1951); 26 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 373 (1951). "There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 3670-3672 . . .
providing for government priority over inchoate liens which antedate its own liens."
United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1946).
"It would seem, however, that the [federal] lien was intended to attach to the
property of the taxpayer subject to existing encumbrances; and this is borne out by the
provision that it shall not be valid as against mortgagees, purchasers, or judgement
creditors until notice thereof is duly filed as provided by the act. This interpretation
places liens of the federal government and liens of the states on an equal basis for the
application of the principle first in time, first in right . . . which is the principle
ordinarily applied with respect to priority of liens.... ".United States v. City of
Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 966 (4th Cir. 1941).
For cases granting the competing lien priority see, e.g., United States v. Winnett,
165 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946) ;
United States v. 52.11 Acres of Land, 73 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Mo. 1947); New York
Casualty Co. v. Zwerner, .58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1944); Board of Supervisors v.
Hart, 210 La. 78, 26 So.2d 361 (1946) ; United States v. Yates, 204 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947).
For cases granting the federal lien priority see Miller v. Baik of America, Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948), affirming, Bank of America v. United
States, 73 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Cal. 1946) ; United States v. Fisher, 93 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.
Cal. 1948).
31. 340 U.S. 47 (1950). For a discussion of this case see 39 GEo. L.J. 496 (1951)
35 MINN. L. REv. 580 (1951); 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 373 (1951).
32. "In cases involving a kindred matter, i.e., the federal priority under Rev. Stat.
§ 3466, it has never been held sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show
a lien effective to protect the lienor against others than the Government, but contin-
gent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it. . . . If the purpose of the federal
tax lien statute to insure prompt and certain collection of the taxes due the United
States from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here." United
NOTES
A federal tax lien will be held superior to a contingent and inchoate
attachment lien even though the latter is prior in time.
The historical argument for priority of federal claims is that they
must be protected in order to secure adequate revenue for the public
benefit."3 The Government cannot exist or function properly and effi-
ciently unless taxes are collectable with speed and certainty. When the
debtor is insolvent, some of his creditors are going to suffer in any
event, and it is contended that other claims, even those of states and their
local subdivisions, should be subordinate to the claims of the United
States which involve a wider public interest. 4 The Court's concept that
federal claims must be given priority for the purpose of securing an
adequate public revenue is questionable in light of the Bankruptcy Act
in which Congress has given tax claims a low priority.3"
The Government has met great resistance in its efforts to gain
the benefits of the Security Trust doctrine." There are noticeable
efforts on the part of both the state and federal courts to avoid this
stringent rule which frequently results in federal priority. At the same
time the Supreme Court has evidenced its determination to abide by
and continue its announced rule."
One obvious way for the lower courts to attempt to circumvent the
Security Trust doctrine is to be very liberal as to what constitutes a
specific and perfected lien. The Supreme Court has established three
criteria for determining whether or not a lien is sufficiently specific and
States v. Security Trust & Saving Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950).
33. "It [the right of priority of payment of debts due to the government] is
founded not so much upon any personal advantage to the sovereign as upon motives of
public policy, in order to secure an adequate revenue to sustain the public burdens, and
discharge the public debts." United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 308, 310 (1832).
34. Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal
Taxes, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 739, 747 (1947).
35. See Note, 56 YALE L.J. 1258, 1263 (1947).
36. In Brown v. General Laundry Service, Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 371, 94 A.2d 10,
14 (1952), rev'd sub torn. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), the court
refused to acknowledge that the Security Trust case gave no significance to the differ-
ence between § 3466, a priority statute, and § 3670, a lien statute.
37. Some doubt was cast on the Security Trust doctrine when in United States v.
Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953), the Supreme Court based its decision of
federal priority solely on Section 3466 rather than holding for the government on both
Section 3466 and Section 3670. Since the debtor was in receivership, the government
had asserted priority under both sections. For the view that Section 3670 is not limited
to cases where the debtor is solvent see Evans v. Stewart, 66 N.W. 2d 442, 445 (Iowa-
1954) ; In re Decker's Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 341, 49 A.2d 714, 717 (1947) ; In re Meyer's
Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 300, 48 A.2d 210, 213 (1946).
But in subsequent decisions the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Security Trust
doctrine. See United States v. Acri, 75 Sup. Ct. 239 (1955); United States v. Liver-
pool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 75 Sup. Ct. 247 (1955); United States v. New
Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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perfected for federal purposes under Section 3466: The lienor must
be identified, 9 the amount of the lien must be certain,4" and the prop-
erty to which the lien attaches must be definite." In addition to these
tests the court has suggested that a transfer of title or possession is
necessary to make the lien specific and perfected.4"
A Florida court in U.S. v. Griffin Moore Lumber Co.,43 while
making no mention of the Security Trust doctrine, gave an antecedent
materialman's lien priority. The labor and material supplied to the
debtor had, said the court, enhanced the value of his property and it
would be unjust enrichment if another claimant could now take advan-
tage of this increased value of the land. The court held that to give
the federal claim priority would be "contrary to equity and would con-
travene every natural impulse."44 This case relied heavily on cases prior
to Security Trust, especially In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp.4" which
had held that the federal tax lien which was filed first was subordinate
to a mechanic's lien which under state law related back to the date the
work began. This relation-back doctrine had been expressly repudiated
in the Security Trust case. 6
In a suit arising in Alaska,4" in which the facts were similar to
those of the Taylorcraft case, the court, while recognizing the reason and
38. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946).
39. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544, 550 (1936).
40. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc. 323 U.S. 353, 357 (1945).
41. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 487 (1941); In re Lane's Estate, 244
Iowa 1076, 1081, 59 N.W.2d 593, 596 (1953).
42. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953) ; Illinois
ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946). See discussion of this require-
ment in Note, 56 YALE L.J. 1258, 1262 (1947).
43. 62 So.2d 589- (Fla. 1953). For a criticism of this case see 7 MIAXi L.Q. 588
(1953).
44. "Furnishing labor and material not only results in unjust enrichment of the
lands but it is the very source of the laborer and materialman's bread and butter.
This of itself was reason enough why the Federal Statute did not give the Federal tax
lien priority over the laborer or materialman's lien. United States v. Griffin Moore
Lumber Co., 62 So.2d 589, 590 (Fla. 1953).
45. 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948).
46. "Nor can the doctrine of relation back-which by process of judicial reasoning
merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the judgment lien back to the
date of attachment-operate to destroy the realities of the situation." United States v.
Security Trust & Saving Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
Several cases have sustained a surety's equitable lien over a government's lien
using the relation-back doctrine. Before Security Trust: American Surety Co. v.
Louisville Municipal Housing Comm'n, 63 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ky. 1945); In re Van
Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Ky. 1943. After Security Trust: United States Fidel-
ity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Alabama-Tennes-
see Natural Gas Co. v. Lehman-Hoge & Scott, 122 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ala. (1954);
United States v. Crosland Constr. Co., 120 F. Supp. 792 (E.D.S.C. 1954) ; Am. Fidelity
Co. v. Delany, 114 F. Supp. 702 (D. Vt. 1953).
47. Kel Weatherstrip, Inc. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555 (D. Alaska 1954).
NOTES
justice of the latter decision, held that the Security Trust doctrine had
to be followed. Under federal law the mechanic's lien could not be con-
sidered perfected on the date the federal lien attached, and therefore
the United States was entitled to priority." In two other cases recently
decided in the federal courts4 9 the question whether or not antecedent
mechanic's liens were specific and perfected was considered; both courts
held that the liens satisfied the three requirements and were thus en-
titled to priority. The Government's contention that the mechanic's
liens were not perfected until reduced to judgment was not accepted. In
neither of these cases did the lienor divest the debtor of title or posses-
sion.
The controversy between the United States and state and local
governments as to priority has a long history. The decisions have up-
held the power of Congress to give priority to debts due the Federal
Government although the debts subordinated were prior claims due the
state or its political subdivisions ;" the hardship to the state, if any, is
said to be the result of federal supremacy.5 There have been several
recent cases in which the courts through the Security Trust doctrine
have held that particular state and local tax liens were specific and per-
fected and thus entitled to priority.5 2 In United States v. Gilbert Asso-
dates, Inc.,53 the Supreme Court refused to reach that result holding
that local tax liens were subordinate to federal tax liens since the owner
had not been divested of title or possession of the property. This strict
interpretation of specificity was made under Section 3466. In a later
case decided under Section 3670 the Supreme Court" for the first time
48. Cf. United States v. Eisinger Mill & Lumber Co., 202 Md. 613, 98 A.2d 81
(1953).
49. United States v. Albert Holman Lumber Co., 206 F.2d 685, petition for re-
hearing denied, 208 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Fredericek's Brewing
Co., 4 P-H 1954 FED. TAX. SERV. ff 72889 (N.D. Ill.). Cf. Great Am. Indemnity Co. v.
United States, 120 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. La. 1954).
50. See note 19 supra.
51. If there is any hardship to the state it "is the necessary consequence of the
supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects to which the legislatitve
power of Congress extends." United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 304, 317
(1804). But see United States v. Nicholls, 4 Pa. 251 (1805), writ of error dismissed,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 378 (1819).
52. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) ; United States v. Canadian
American Co., 108 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 751 (2d
Cir. 1953).
See In re Ann Arbor Brewing Co., 110 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Mich. 1951) where
assets were distributed among the federal and state governments under general equity
doctrines rather than under Security Trust.
See Smith v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 702 (D. Hawaii 1953), where priority is
given the territorial lien on the doctrine of first in time, first in right, without discuss-
ing Security Trust.
53. 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
54. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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found that a lien was specific and perfected." The local lien here was
not accompanied by title or possession, and the Gilbert case was distin-
guished on the ground that it involved personal property, an insolvent
taxpayer, and a general lien.56
The courts have also attempted to avoid the stringency of federal
priority by characterizing the competing lien as one falling within the
four protected categories provided in Section 3672. In Hawkins v.
Savage57 the federal lien arose prior to the attachment lien but was filed
subsequent to it. The district court held that the competing lienor pre-
vailed since the statute put him in the position of a purchaser. This ap-
proach can be criticized on several grounds. In the first place it is con-
trary to the accepted construction of Section 3672 as is borne out in a
New Hampshire case"8 in which that state's supreme court held that
through the assessment of taxes the town was given the status of judg-
ment creditor, and that, consequently, a filing of the federal lien was
necessary to establish federal priority. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision on the ground that pursuant to the cardinal
principle of uniformity in taxation Congress used the words "judgment
creditor" in their "usual, conventional sense as a judgment of a court of
55. This case raised the complex problem of "circuity of priority." There were
two mortgages and a judgment lien prior in time to the federal lien; there were town
liens, some of which arose prior to and some subsequent to the federal lien. Under
federal law the mortgages and judgment liens concededly had priority over the federal
lien; the federal lien was clearly entitled to priority over the subsequent town liens.
As to those liens arising prior to the federal lien, under Security Trust the question
of priority turned on the issue of specificity. Under state law the town liens had prior-
ity over the mortgages and judgment lien. The problem was how to distribute the
funds so that neither federal nor state law would be violated. This problem has been
dealt with by several courts with varying solutions.
The state court in Brown v. General Laundry Service, 139 Conn. 363, 373, 94 A.2d
10, 15 (1952), found that "the only reasonable interpretation of § 3672 is that the
Congress, in enacting it, expressed the intention that federal liens should be subordi-
nated to such mortgages and judgment liens as are described therein, and, consequently,
subordinated to such other incumbrances as have priority over those mortgages and
judgment liens." See also Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 232, 124 Atl. 577
(1924). For cases following a different line of reasoning see Smith v. United States,
113 F. Supp. 702 (D. Hawaii 1953); Samms v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 349 Il1.
App. 413, 111 N.E.2d 172 (1953).
The United States Supreme Court only settled the question of which liens had
priority over the federal government. The court refused to concern itself with the
question of whether the state and its subdivisions received its revenue prior to creditors
preferred under Section 3672. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 88 (1954).
For further discussion of this problem see Anderson, supra note 21, at 269; Ken-
nedy, supra note 10, at 927; 67 HARv. L. REv. 358 (1953).
56. This has led some to believe that the requirements for specificity and perfec-
tion under Section 3670 are not as strict as under Section 3466. Kel Weatherstrip, Inc.
v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Alaska 1954); Kennedy, supra note 10, at 929.
57. 110 F. Supp. 615 (D. Alaska 1953).
58. Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N.H. 411, 90 A.2d 499 (1952).
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record. . . . "" Analogously, the word "purchaser" should be construed
to have its usual meaning. Secondly, it is questionable, whether the state
statute is susceptible of such construction.6" Finally, it should be noted
that in this case the attachment lien was not prior in time and therefore
should not be prior in rank.6 1
Implicit in these cases which strive to grant priority to the com-
peting lien are two problems: Is there in reality a public benefit in
granting federal priority over preceding liens, and should priority of
liens depend on specificity and perfection? The cases involving me-
chanic's liens indicate that the amount gained by the government in any
particular case may be comparatively small while at the same time a
substantial loss may result to the competing creditor. Of course, it may
be pointed out that, although in each particular case the sum may be
rather insignificant, the total amount of lost revenue, resulting from a
large number of cases, could create a very serious problem for the Fed-
eral Government.
If the argument in favor of federal priority is accepted, it still does
not seem sound that priority of competing liens should depend on spe-
cificity. It is difficult to see why the Federal Government should be
given priority over certain secured creditors and not over others.62 The
doctrine of the general and inchoate lien, besides being a questionable
policy, is also undesirable because of the conflict and uncertainty it has
produced. Creditors competing with federal claims are unable to predict,
with any degree of success, whether the lower courts will follow the
United States Supreme Court cases or attempt to circumvent them.
Statutes which have been in existence so long and construed so often
should not give rise to so much costly, frustrating, and time consuming
59. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 364 (1953). See also
United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1950) (concur-
ring opinion) ; Macatee, Inc. v. United States, 214 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1954) ; In re Litt,
128 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1955); In re Green, 124 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Ala. 1954);
State ex rel Okla. Employment Security Comm'n v. United States, 266 P.2d 973 (Okla.
1953); In re Capitol Cleaners & Dyers, 233 P.2d 377 (Utah 1951). But cf. United
States v. Preferred Contractors, 122 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Evans v. Stewart,
66 N.W.2d 442, 449 (Iowa 1954).
60. The Alaska statute said that the attachment lienor's rights against third per-
sons shall be deemed the same as those of a bona fide purchaser. The statute did not
make the lien holder a purchaser. See Kel Weatherstrip, Inc. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp.
555, 560 (D. Alaska 1954).
61. See note 29 supra.
62. "No reason appears why the standing of a lien against federal priority should
be made to depend on the specificity of the subject property or upon a technical divest-
ment of title. Although liens having specificity and title divestment should be protected
inasmuch as they usually represent security transactions upon which there has been
reliance, reliance may also be present where the lien is general, like one upon fluctuat-
ing inventory, or where there has been no title divestment as in a lien-theory mort-
gage." 68 H~Av. L. REv. 722, 723 (1955).
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litigation.63
The Court recently handed down three decisions overruling the
opinions of two federal courts and one state -court which had used one
or more of the above methods of circumventing the stringency of federal
priority. In United States v. Scovil the state court64 held that a land-
lord's claim protected by distress (after the Collector of Internal Reve-
nue received the assessments but prior to the filing) was entitled to pro-
tection against the unfiled tax lien. The Supreme Court" reversed and
ruled that the Government must prevail since the distress lien did not
fall within any of the four categories provided in section 3672, thus
making filing unnecessary to protect the Government lien.6 The Court
went on to say that in any event the distress lien was not perfected; it
was merely a "caveat of a more perfect lien to come" and therefore
could not defeat federal priority. Since the distress lien was subsequent
to the date of the federal lien and was not within the conventional defi-
nition of the four categories, the result of the case seems sound.
Two cases presented similar problems for the Court's consideration.
In one there was an attachment, a federal tax lien, and then a judg-
ment ; in the other there was a garnishment lien and then a federal tax
lien.68 Although these cases presented the same fact situation and legal
question as the Security Trust case,69 the lower court"6 distinguished them
from that decision with the statement that in Security Trust the state
law granted no effectiveness to the attachment proceedings while in
these cases the competing creditor acquired a valid lien under state law."'
On this basis, priority was granted to the antecedent private creditor.
The Supreme Court reversed stating that its answer "was the same as in
63. Note, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 583, 591 (1954).
64. United States v. Scovil, 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E.2d 277 (1953).
65. United States v. Scovil, 75 Sup. Ct. 244 (1955).
66. For a subsequent court following the Supreme Court reasoning in the Scovil
case see In re Litt, 128 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
67. United States v. Acri, 75 Sup. Ct. 239 (1955).
68. United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 75 Sup. Ct. 247 (1955).
69. "The question presented here is whether a tax lien of the United States is
prior in right to an attachment lien where the federal tax lien was recorded subse-
quent to the date of the attachment lien but prior to the date the attaching creditor
obtained judgment." United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 48
(1950).
70. Sunnyland Wholesale Furniture Co. v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co.,
107 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Tex. 1952), aff'd sub. noma. United States v. Liverpool & Lon-
don & Globe Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Acri, 109 F. Supp.
943 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
71. For other cases using the same device to distinguish away Security Trust see
United States v. Albert Holman Lumber Co., 206 F.2d 685, aff'd, 208 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir. 1953); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118 (10th
Cir. 1952); Ferbro Trading Corp. v. Jo-Mar Dress Corp., 78 Pa. Dist. & Co. 337
(1951).
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the Security Trust case and for the same reasons."7 2 The Supreme
Court found the cases indistinguishable from Security Trust and from
each other, 3 and ruled that the state's characterization of its liens was
not binding on the federal court; the competing liens were, for federal
purposes, inchoate. The Supreme Court, although thus given the op-
portunity to review and perhaps alter its decision, in no uncertain or
vague language, affirmed the Security Trust case.
The various writers have differed as to whether or not the federal
tax claims should be given absolute priority" and have presented sound
arguments in support of both positions. No matter which course is
favored, there is a need for congressional clarification in this area.
Congress should review the system of priorities in the various statu-
tory provisions and establish precise and uniform standards to control
the courts in the determination of the priorities of federal tax claims
and competing liens.
EMBEZZLEMENT AND INCOME UNDER THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
The federal income tax, primary source of revenue for the National
Government, is levied upon "all income from any source whatever."'-
This broad definition encompasses income from illegal business opera-
72. United States v. Acri, 75 Sup. Ct. 239, 241 (1955).
73. United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 75 Sup. Ct. 247, 248
(1955).
74. For arguments favoring federal priority see Sarner, supra note 34, at 746
(1947). For those opposing federal priority see Kennedy, supra note 10; Note, 29
N.C.L. REv. 293, 300 (1951).
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a). This section replaces Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 22(a), 52 STAT. 457, but does not appreciably alter its interpretation. 1 CCH 1955
STAND. FED. TAX REP., 636.
2. Bootlegging: United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927); Maddas v.
Commissioner, 114 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1940); Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564
(2nd Cir. 1926). Black market operations: United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 853 (1948); Wallace H. Petit, 10 T.C. 1253
(1948). Lotteries: Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937); Huntington v.
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 835 (1937). Bookmaking: James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A.
326 (1925). Usurious loans: Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938);
Mitchell M. Frey, 1 B.T.A. 338 (1925) ; Terrell v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 773 (1927).
Unlawful insurance policies: Patterson v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
Fraudulent land sales: Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1954). Illegal
movie transportation: George L. Rickard, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929). Income from abor-
tion: Mary Luginbuhl, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 968 (1949).
